The bla ESBL and bla AmpC genes in Enterobacteriaceae are spread by plasmid-mediated integrons, insertion sequences, and transposons, some of which are homologous in bacteria from food animals, foods, and humans. These genes have been frequently identified in Escherichia coli and Salmonella from food animals, the most common being bla CTX-M-1 , bla CTX-M-14 , and bla CMY-2 . Identification of risk factors for their occurrence in food animals is complex. In addition to generic antimicrobial use, cephalosporin usage is an important risk factor for selection and spread of these genes. Extensive international trade of animals is a further risk factor. There are no data on the effectiveness of individual control options in reducing public health risks. A highly effective option would be to stop or restrict cephalosporin usage in food animals. Decreasing total antimicrobial use is also of high priority. Implementation of measures to limit strain dissemination (increasing farm biosecurity, controls in animal trade, and other general postharvest controls) are also important.
( Table 1 ). The most frequent ESBLs in Enterobacteriaceae belong to the TEM, SHV, and CTX-M families. There are also some class D ß-lactamases (so-called oxacillinases) that might be considered "extended spectrum" enzymes.
Before 2000, SHV and TEM types of ESBLs were the predominant variants found in Klebsiella species and Escherichia coli, mainly causing human nosocomial infections. The corresponding genes were often located on transmissible plasmids, facilitating their efficient spread. During the last decade, CTX-M-type enzymes spread worldwide, being now the most prevalent ESBLs in human Enterobacteriaceae. Whereas ESBLs used to be produced mainly by nosocomial Klebsiella pneumoniae, communityacquired E. coli producing CTX-M enzymes (specifically CTX-M-15) has been increasingly reported.
AmpC β-lactamases are intrinsic cephalosporinases found on the chromosome of many gram-negative bacteria. These enzymes confer resistance to penicillins and to first-, second-, and third-generation cephalosporins, including β-lactam/ inhibitor combinations and cephamycins, but usually not to fourth-generation cephalosporins and carbapenems. A growing number of AmpC enzymes have now "escaped" onto plasmids (termed "acquired" or "plasmidic" AmpCs). Such enzymes fall into 6 phylogenetic groups, with CMY-2 being the most common.
Significance and Public Health Threat of Human Infections With ESBL/AmpC β Lactamase-Producing Bacteria
Community-and healthcare-associated infections with ESBL/ AmpC β-lactamase-producing bacteria have been increasingly reported worldwide [1] . Reports from the European Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance System show that in hospitals in Europe, rates of invasive E. coli and K. pneumoniae isolates resistant to cefotaxime and ceftazidime have been increasing since 2000 [2] . This is recognized as a public health threat because resistance to β-lactams and coresistance to other antimicrobial classes (eg, the fluoroquinolones) limit the choice of effective antimicrobial agents available for treatment and commonly used as first-line therapy [1] . Moreover, infections with ESBL/AmpC β-lactamase-producing bacteria may result in delays in the initiation of timely and adequate antimicrobial therapy [3] , increased morbidity and mortality, longer hospital stays, and higher costs [3, 4] .
Of the many risk factors found associated with patient colonization or infection with ESBL or AmpC ß-lactamaseproducing bacteria [5, 6] , prior antibiotic use, especially with the oxyimino-ß-lactams (cefuroxime, cefotaxime, ceftriaxone, ceftazidime, or aztreonam) [7, 8] , fluoroquinolones [9] and ß-lactam-ß-lactamase inhibitor combinations [9] , has been consistently reported.
Possible Reservoirs of ESBL/AmpC β-Lactamase-Producing Bacteria
Transmission of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae from person to person has been demonstrated in hospital, community, and household settings, the evidence strongly suggesting that human intestinal colonization with these resistant organisms serves as a reservoir for spread [10] [11] [12] . The primary reservoirs, however, of such organisms are still contentious. ESBL/AmpCproducing E. coli and Salmonella have been isolated from food animals in many European countries, particularly poultry and cattle, and farm animals are now recognized as important carriers [13] . Similarly, there have been an increasing number of reports of isolations from foods of animal origin [14] . These reports raise questions about the possible role of animal-and food-related reservoirs in the spread of ESBL/AmpC-producing microorganisms. This paper reviews the public health risks of bacterial strains producing ESBL or AmpC enzymes in food and food-producing animals, with particular reference to the situation in the European Union (EU). Methods for their detection and possible control options to limit their spread are discussed. Official harmonized monitoring of resistance to third-generation cephalosporins in EU member states is based on cefotaxime susceptibility patterns. In those EU countries reporting such resistance, the occurrence of cefotaxime resistance was low among E. coli and Salmonella isolates recovered from nonselective plates. Total prevalences in different animal species and meat in 2009 ranged from 0.4% to 5% for Salmonella, and from 2% to 9% for E. coli [15] . In studies targeted to detect ESBL or AmpC genes, the percentages of samples of food-producing animals or food in which ESBL-carrying E. coli were detected varied from 0.2% to 40%. Percentages of occurrence ranged from 10% to 40% in Portugal, the Netherlands, and France, with slightly lower percentages in other countries [15] . In a pilot study carried out in the Netherlands, 100% of broiler farms and >80% of animals were positive for ESBL E. coli [16] . The prevalence of ESBLs among Salmonella isolates was much lower than for E. coli, with percentages of <1% found in 2 studies in Germany and Spain, respectively [17, 18] . The methodology used in the different studies is heterogeneous, and comparisons are therefore difficult.
ESBL-AND
ESBL-producing (eg, TEM, SHV, CTX-M, PER) and AmpCproducing (eg, CMY, DHA-1, ACT-1) organisms have been detected in food-producing animals (poultry, swine, bovines, horses, rabbits, ostriches, wild boar), marine aquaculture systems, and foods of animal origin [15] . The most common ESBL genes are those encoding CTX-M enzymes. In foodproducing animals and food in EU countries, 11 different ESBL subtypes of the CTX-M type have been described, with CTX-M-1 being most common [15] . Although CTX-M-15 has spread in a pandemic fashion in humans, the enzyme type has been only recently been reported in food-producing animals or food, and then only in very few EU countries [19] [20] [21] . SHV ESBLs, in particular SHV-12 and SHV-2, have been also frequently detected throughout the European Union. The most frequently detected TEM ESBL has been TEM-52, whereas TEM-20 has been less common. The type of AmpC β-lactamase detected was almost always the CMY-2 variant [15] . ESBL producers have been mostly found in Europe, whereas AmpC producers have been particularly common in North America, mirroring the trends for human isolates. ESBL and AmpC genes have most frequently been detected in E. coli and nontyphoidal Salmonella in isolates from terrestrial food-producing animals; and in Aeromonas, Vibrio, and Edwardsiella species from fish [15] .
Transmission of ESBL/AmpC genes in both humans and animals is mainly driven by the IncF, IncI, IncN, IncA/C, IncL/M, and IncK plasmid families [22] . Most of these plasmid types can only replicate within Enterobacteriaceae, and show a narrow host range (ie, IncF, IncI, IncK). Plasmids of other families (ie, IncA/C) can replicate within the species of many genera and even families, and are defined as broad-host-range plasmids. IncA/C plasmids have been associated with the spread of bla CMY-2 in both the United States and the United Kingdom [23] and IncN, IncI, and IncL/M plasmids with the spread of bla CTX-M-1 , bla CTX-M-3 , and bla TEM-52 in Europe [24] . IncK plasmids carrying the bla CTX-M-14 gene have become diffused in both Spain and the United Kingdom [25] .
Clonal expansion of ESBL/AmpC producers has also been documented. Specific clones of E. coli such as B2-E. coli O25b: H4-sequence type (ST) 131, D-E. coli O25a-ST648, and D-E. coli ST69 and ST393 have been increasingly detected among humans and animals [20, [26] [27] [28] . Other clones of E. coli (ST57, ST156, ST371) are widespread among poultry in some EU countries and in Japan [29] [30] [31] . Recent reports documenting outbreaks of ESBL producers of Shiga toxin-producing E. coli clones O111:H8 and O104:H4 linked to food or food-producing animals are of concern [32, 33] . A range of Salmonella serovars (Salmonella Agona, Salmonella Virchow, Salmonella Infantis, Salmonella Typhimurium) have been associated with the dissemination of ESBLs in poultry, cattle, and pigs. AmpC producers of Salmonella Heidelberg and Salmonella Newport have been reported, mostly in cattle in North America [15] . The diversity of genetic contexts and clonal or plasmid backgrounds is comprehensively tabulated elsewhere [15] .
Transmission of ESBL/AmpC-Resistant Bacterial Strains or Resistance Genes to Humans by Consumption or Handling of Contaminated Food or Through the Food-Animal Production Environment
There are few studies that provide evidence of the existence of common clones of ESBL-or AmpC-producing E. coli in foods of animal origin and in humans [19, 21, 34] . Transmission of ESBL/AmpC-producing Salmonella from different animal species, including poultry, to humans throughout the food chain has been suggested in different studies [15] , although the evidence with regard to the possibility of spread of such organisms to humans via direct contact with animals, or indirectly via the environment, is limited [35] . People working with poultry have been demonstrated to have a higher risk for intestinal carriage of ESBL/AmpC-producing bacteria [36] .
The occurrence of Enterobacteriaceae resistant to carbapenems is a growing threat in human medicine. The presence of such resistance in bacteria from animals is largely unknown, although E. coli producing VIM-1 carbapenemase resistance has been recently recorded in pigs in Germany [37] . As yet, there are no indications of the zoonotic transfer of such resistance to humans.
METHODS (PHENOTYPIC AND GENOTYPIC), AND THE INTERPRETIVE CRITERIA CURRENTLY USED FOR DETECTION (ISOLATION AND IDENTIFICATION) AND CHARACTERIZATION OF ESBL-OR AmpC-PRODUCING BACTERIAL STRAINS, ESBL-OR AmpC-ENCODING GENES, AND ASSOCIATED MOBILE ELEMENTS
Isolation from animal feces or foods is optimally performed with selective growth media preceded by selective enrichment in broth, using low concentrations of cefotaxime or ceftriaxone as the selective agent. Suspected isolates are identified and confirmed as ESBL or AmpC producers by phenotypic confirmation tests using harmonized interpretive criteria such as those proposed by the European Committee on Antimicrobial Testing of the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute). Final identification is performed by molecular characterization of the genes conferring resistance.
Molecular identification of ESBL or AmpC genes is performed by screening assays using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or microarray, and subsequent sequence analysis. Lists of primers for the most important β-lactamases in Enterobacteriaceae have been published [38] . Several commercial microarrays have been developed for rapid and specific detection of β-lactamase genes [39, 40] . Identification of the subtype of the ESBL or AmpC genes detected by PCR or microarray is normally conducted by sequence analysis of PCR fragments.
Plasmid isolation and electrophoresis in agarose gels provides information on the number and mass/size of plasmids present in one isolate. Transfer of plasmids to well-characterized recipients by conjugation or electroporation facilitates the typing of individual plasmids. Categorization of plasmids in incompatibility groups can be performed by PCR-based replicon typing method, targeting the major plasmid families of Enterobacteriaceae [41] . Novel plasmid families can be recognized by complete DNA sequencing, also using the relaxase gene as a phylogenetic marker [42] . Further characterization of plasmids belonging to groups I, F, N, HI2, and HI can be performed by plasmid multilocus sequence typing (MLST) [43] (http://pubmlst.org/plasmid/).
The purpose of molecular typing is to determine genetic relatedness of isolates to allow source tracking/attribution. The discriminatory power varies among methods, and influences the conclusions that can be drawn from the results. The choice of method is determined by the goal of the work. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis or multiple loci variable number of tandem repeats analysis are often used to identify clonal clusters of isolates that are related to a certain "outbreak" in a restricted time frame. MLST is often the method used to identify the relatedness of isolates of the same species from different backgrounds (eg, animal vs human).
RISK FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE OCCURRENCE, EMERGENCE, AND SPREAD OF ESBL-OR AmpC-PRODUCING BACTERIAL STRAINS IN FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS AND FOOD
A variety of farm management factors may facilitate the introduction and spread of ESBL-and AmpC-producing bacteria (eg, animal exposure to contaminated water or feed; absence of water acidification in poultry production) [44, 45] . The establishment of risk factors for occurrence of ESBL/AmpCproducing bacteria is complicated by scarcity or lack of accuracy of reliable data. Further research is needed to understand more about the driving forces that have led to the rapid spread of these resistant bacteria in many countries worldwide.
Most ESBL-and AmpC-producing strains may carry additional resistances such as to sulfonamides and other commonly used veterinary drugs. Therefore, persistence and dissemination of ESBL/AmpC-producing bacteria can be selected for by the use in food-producing animals, not only of cephalosporins, but also of other compounds such as amoxicillin, sulphonamides, trimethoprim, fluoroquinolones, and aminoglycosides [44, 45] . The most efficient selection pressure will be driven by systemic use of third-and fourth-generation cephalosporins. A strong correlation between a reduction in ceftiofur-resistant Salmonella Heidelberg and ceftiofur-resistant E. coli (both producing AmpC) from both human infections and retail poultry in different regions of Canada and withdrawal of ceftiofur for disease prophylaxis in hatcheries has been reported [46] . In the European Union, approved systemic use of third-and fourth-generation cephalosporins is limited to cases that are expected to respond poorly to other antimicrobials; no use is approved for poultry. Off-label use of cephalosporins also occurs. For instance, ceftiofur has been used prophylactically in 1-day-old piglets [47] , and there are also indications of its widespread off-label use of in poultry (eg, in ovo use, or use as spray or by subcutaneous injection in hatcheries). Moreover, illegal use has likely increased owing to simplified access through the Internet.
An extensive trade of animals occurs in the European Union, with few countries leading the production and the export, and with a small number of companies producing pure-line grandparent stock. How widespread are ESBL-carrying bacteria in food-producing animals is generally unknown, although few reports suggest that ESBL/AmpC are not uncommon in the top of some production pyramids. In Sweden, transmission of resistant bacteria from imported breeding chickens was documented by findings of E. coli carrying genes in environmental samples from hatcheries rearing production animals or breeding stock (parent animals) [48] . Recent data from the Netherlands indicate that ESBL-or AmpC-producing E. coli are introduced in the Dutch poultry production chain through imported day-old grandparent chickens. Moreover, the data indicate that the occurrence of these organisms in the different levels layers of the Dutch poultry production chain is the result of vertical transmission, local recirculation, and selection [36, 49] .
Contamination of meat products with resistant bacteria may contribute to further spread within the human population. This has been shown to be particularly applicable to ESBLs, where genes might rapidly transfer from foodborne commensals to human pathogens [34, 50] .
Contamination of food of plant origin with bacteria producing ESBLs or AmpC has also been recognized, as demonstrated by the recent large outbreak caused by CTX-M-15-producing E. coli O104:H4 linked to the consumption of contaminated sprouts [51] .
Recommendations for further research are (1) to undertake risk assessments to quantify relationships (if any) between the occurrence of ESBL/AmpC-producing bacteria in foodproducing animals and antimicrobial consumption (both of cephalosporins and all antimicrobials overall) and (2) to perform cross-sectoral studies to assess and quantify factors contributing to the emergence and dissemination of ESBL/ AmpC resistance in different food animal species.
POSSIBLE CONTROL OPTIONS TO REDUCE THE PUBLIC HEALTH RISK CAUSED BY ESBL-OR AmpC-PRODUCING BACTERIAL STRAINS TRANSMITTED VIA THE FOOD CHAIN OR THE FOOD-ANIMAL PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT
The effect of reducing the prevalence of ESBL-or AmpCproducing bacteria in animals or food on public health risks is difficult to assess. Although there is evidence of the contribution of resistant microorganisms transmitted via food-producing animals and food to public health risks, it is difficult to quantify that risk. Moreover, the magnitude of the contribution from 
Control Measure Options
Stop/reduce the use of cephalosporins in food animals
• Provided adequate compliance, the measure would be more effective the more comprehensive the restrictions.
• The restrictions could range from stopping all uses of cephalosporins/systemically active third-and fourth-generation cephalosporins, to more or less strict restriction of their use, allowing use only under specific circumstances.
Increase compliance with existing legislation
• Off-label use of veterinary medicinal products, including cephalosporins, is restricted according to articles 10 and 11 of Directive 2001/82/EC as amended. Such use should be limited to use by way of exception, under the veterinarian's direct personal responsibility and in particular to avoid causing unacceptable suffering.
Decrease the total antimicrobial use in animal production in the European Union animals and foods to public health risks, and the perception of the risks for humans, will be greatly influenced by the local epidemiology of ESBL-or AmpC-producing organisms in healthcare settings and in the community. This epidemiology may vary greatly by country. In countries where human associated ESBL-or AmpC-producing clones have spread endemically in healthcare settings and the community, contaminated animals and foods will have a minor relative importance compared to countries where these organisms occur only incidentally in healthcare settings and the community.
Public health risks caused by ESBL-or AmpC-producing bacteria are primarily determined by (1) the frequency of the occurrence (prevalence) and the quantity of these organisms in food-producing animals and food, (2) the genetic characteristics of the β-lactamase genes involved, and (3) the transmission from animals or food to humans. Mitigation measures should therefore aim to reduce the prevalence in animals and food, and to reduce transmission from contaminated animals and foods to humans.
The prevalence of resistant organisms in a certain niche (animals or foods) is determined by 2 basic mechanisms: (1) selection by antibiotic usage and (2) dissemination within farms and animal production chains.
There are no data on the comparative efficiency of individual control options in reducing public health risks caused by ESBLor AmpC-producing bacteria related to food-producing animals. Prioritization is complex, and the effectiveness of measures discussed is based on the best available evidence and expert opinion ( Table 2 ). As such, a highly effective control option to reduce selection of ESBL/AmpC-producing bacteria at an EU level would be to stop all uses of cephalosporins or systemically active third-and fourth-generation cephalosporins, or to restrict their use (ie, only allowed under specific circumstances). The more comprehensive the restriction, the more prominent would be the effect on selection pressure, although a very restrictive policy might have unintended consequences on animal health and welfare if effective antimicrobials are not available for treatment.
Efforts should be directed to the implementation of measures intended to minimize off-label use of cephalosporins. Because coresistance is an important issue, decreasing the total antimicrobial use in animal production in the European Union is also of high priority. Also of importance (more so after the ESBL/ AmpC-producing microorganisms have emerged) are the measures to control their dissemination, such as by implementing increased farm biosecurity and controls on animal trade (of ESBL/AmpC-carriers), or by improving hygiene throughout the food chain (implementing general postharvest controls for foodborne pathogens). Because most evidence is available for high prevalence of ESBL/AmpC-producing bacteria in the poultry production pyramid [16, 36, 48, 49] , and their consequent involvement in public health [34, 50] , it is of high priority to reduce selection pressure imposed by the use of antimicrobials, to prevent vertical transmission from the top of the poultry production pyramid and to prevent local recirculation within flocks.
CONCLUSIONS
Because of the ubiquity of ESBL-and AmpC-producing bacterial strains and of the associated genetic determinants, it is unlikely that any single control measure will be sufficient to limit their transmission through the food chain. Nevertheless, it is of paramount public health importance that the potential contribution of food-producing animals or foods to public health is minimized. There is little doubt that the use of cephalosporins and related compounds has been one of the driving forces in the spread of organisms exhibiting resistance to such antimicrobials. Stringent controls are therefore necessary to limit the use of cephalosporins in food animals. Owing to coresistance, the general use of antimicrobials is also a risk factor for emergence and spread of clones and/or plasmids carrying these resistance genes. As the most problematic area is the high prevalence of ESBL/AmpC-producing bacteria in the poultry production pyramid and their consequent involvement of such organisms in public health, in the first instance controls should be targeted at poultry production. As an example, a strong correlation between a reduction in ceftiofur-resistant Salmonella and E. coli from human infections and retail poultry and withdrawal of ceftiofur for prophylaxis in hatcheries has been reported in Canada. Of importance are also measures to control dissemination, for example, by implementing increased farm biosecurity and controls on animal trade (of ESBL/AmpC carriers), by improving hygiene throughout the food chain, and by implementing other general postharvest controls for foodborne pathogens. The effectiveness of any control measures should be monitored on a regular basis by targeted surveys of food animals and foods for cephalosporin-resistant bacteria, using selective isolation methods and preenrichment of samples as necessary.
Notes

